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ABSTRACT: The gold standard crisis defined the end of an epoch. From at least
the end of the first world war to the Christmas of 1932, the South African and
Imperial states and mining capital were involved in a struggle over the form of the
South African and international money supplies. Whilst in appearance an abstract
and mysterious debate, the contest over the form of the money supply laid the
foundations for a system of value that penetrated into the daily lives and politics of
many southern Africans. Chief amongst these, were the hundreds of thousands of
migrant mineworkers who, before 1933, received their wages in gold. This paper
explores what is universally understood as being the primary reason for migrant
labour—the need for money. The ideas and practices associated with the control
and transmission of metallic money were at the core of the experience of migrant
labour before the crisis, and, it is argued, formed a major part of the self-definition
of migrant gold miners during the 1920s. Following from this, the paper posits a
re-interpretation of the gold standard crisis. The turning point that coincided with
the new year of 1933 was not merely an economic change but constituted a major
transformation of the form, value, velocity and politics of money throughout
Southern Africa. Coincidently, the crisis was an economic and cultural transition
for the mining industry itself, and marked a dramatic re-definition of the terms of
economic conflict between workers and managers. Finally, this paper presents
evidence for a new periodisation of capitalist development in Southern Africa that
meshes together the cultural and economic dimensions of historial processes in a
manner that foregrounds the experience of the African working class.
* * *
The gold standard crisis occupies an unusual place in South African history. The
boom ushered-in by the freeing up of the South African price of gold in December 1932,
which lasted until the late 1940s, is widely credited for changing the fiscal character of the
South African state and renewing the life and profitability of the gold mining industry.
And yet the events and politics of the crisis are poorly understood. The crisis, where it has
been examined at all, has been treated as a boring episode in the dull drama of white
politics: Hertzog dragged the country, and his most loyal supporters, through economic hell
in order to prove the point about South Africa's independence from Britain. Analyses of
the economic consequences have been confined to the fact that the new South African price
of gold dramatically increased gold mining companies' profits which, in turn, exponentially
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augmented state revenue.2 The published studies have produced some insights into the
politics and consequences of the crisis but all missed or ignored the point that the 1931-2
gold standard crisis was a struggle over the meaning and value of gold and money.
Narrowly conceived, the argument of this study is that the gold standard crisis
marked the transition between two very different systems of organising value. For the
state, mining capital and the societies which provided the mines with their migrant labour
force, gold was the primary means of measuring the value of capital, commodities and
labour before the crisis. From at least 1886 to 1933, with the exception of the five year
period after 1920, gold was money. This metallic form of money had specific consequences
for the preservation and reproduction of systems of value. Chief amongst these was the
ontological tie that existed between money and the labour power of African goldminers.
Before the crisis the wages of mineworkers were held relatively constant by the tangible
connection between the value of their labour power and their production. The period
thereafter was characterised by the ascendancy of paper money, the cyclical inflationary
devaluation of the labour power of African mineworkers and the increasing velocity of
money itself. But the 1932 crisis does not mark a clean break between the gold standard
system and the practice of managed money supply. Throughout the 1920s systems of
value based on gold were unstable and underwent oscillating processes of decay and
recovery. This is a well documented fact.3 What is less well known is how the struggles
over value that took place internationally translated culturally and politically in the region
that was producing more than half of the world's gold. This study suggests that those who
controlled South African gold—whom, for convenience, we will call minelords—were at the
center of two overlapping regimes of value. On the one hand, they negotiated with the
imperial and national states over the form of the South African and international money
supplies. This system was dominated by the ideas and interests of international economists,
financiers and bankers. On the other, they confronted their own workers over the form and
value of wages. African mineworkers, as much as international financiers, lived within
systems of value with their own powerful historical and cultural imperatives. What this
"account suggests, however, is that the two were engaged with one another politically,
economically, and culturally throughout the 1920s. Moreover, this paper argues that we
can understand both the historical record of the 1920s crises of value, and their regional
cultural implications, only by examining both dialogues.
This study owes much to the recent publication of anthropological and historical
studies on the politics of commodities.4 But it is also intended as a critique of some of the
theoretical excesses of this literature, particularly the more extravagant claims of Arjun
Appadurai's work. Appadurai's account is a theoretical call for the integration of the study
of culture and economics and there is much in his work that has been adopted in this paper.
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His notion that commodities "circulate in different regimes of value in space and time" is
very useful as a means of disaggregating the conflicts over gold, and other commodities, in
southern Africa. But his claim, against Marx, that exchange is the source of value, and his
call for a self-conscious methodological fetishism in the investigation of the routes through
which commodities pass during their histories, lends itself to precisely that sort of analysis
of commodities advocated by those who control production. The political consequences of
denying the labour theory of value aside, methodological fetishism has three baneful
consequences for the study of value. The first is the obvious one, highlighted by Mintz's
work, that the conditions of production often directly shape the routes followed by
commodities and usually determine their quantity. The second point is historical. As this
paper will indicate, regimes of value have a tendency to erase one another. Moreover,
commodities can disappear altogether and it then becomes extremely difficult to extract the
periodization-not to speak of value-that might easily be revealed by the conditions of
production. The third point relates to the manner in which the value of a select few
commodities is created by the dialectical engagement of different regimes of value. Gold
has played a unique role as a store of value in the twentieth century history of capitalism.
But as the Chamber of Mines was to learn in the mid-1920s the demand for gold has often
been stronger from non-capitalist countries than from the capitalist West. The two systems
acted to bolster the value of the commodity most used to measure value in each. This
paper suggests that this sort of dialectical reinforcement, which underpinned the value of
gold in a number of geographically and culturally distinct societies, began at the site of
production. The value of commodities like gold emerges, in part, from their capacity to
mediate the contradictions between different societies, cultures or classes. In direct contrast
to a methodological fetishism, this study suggests that it is only by interrogating the
dialectics of different systems of value and class struggle present in the workplace that we
can understand both the manner in which commodities like gold exhibit value and the way
in which the regimes of value they occupy developed historically.
It was characteristic of the fraught marriage of gold and money in the 1920s that the
event which triggered the divorce between the British pound and the gold sovereign had
nothing to do with the London money market or the supply of gold. When the sailors of
H.M.S. Valiant refused to leave the port of Invergordon on Thursday the 17th of
September 1931 they had little idea, as the Rand Daily Mail put it, "that their action was
going to be interpreted in the Bourses of Amsterdam, Berne ... and Wall Street as the
beginning of the end of the British Empire." It was a crisis of confidence in the political
will of the British government and anxiety about the socialist presence in the Labour party
that prompted foreign and domestic depositors to cash in their sterling balances in London.
In the three months preceding the announcement, £200,000,000 was removed from London
in the form of bullion. In the days following the Valiant mutiny the rate of withdrawals
accelerated so sharply that the vaults of the Bank of England contained a mere
£130,000,000 in gold against which to cover the entire money supply.3
Britain's move from the convertible gold standard hardly came as a surprise to John
Martin, the newly appointed Johannesburg Director of the Central Mining Corporation and
the Chairman of Rand Mines, Ltd. Rand Mines—Central Mining had agreed six weeks
before the announcement to hold back £600,000 out of the company funds normally
Rand Dally Mail, 22 September 1931, Star-. 21 September, 1931
remitted for deposit in London.6 That the mining industry, like most of the principals of
financial capital in South Africa and Europe could see the collapse of sterling coming, did
not prevent the Gold Producers' Committee of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, and
particularly the leaders of the Corner House, from attending a series of frantic meetings
with the Minister of Finance, N.C. Havenga, in the week that followed. The British
decision to adandon the monetary role of gold, like the 1922 strike and the declaration of
war in 1939, initially prompted a dramatic defensive strengthening of the ties between the
state and mining capital .
Much has been written about the relationship between the gold-lords and the Hertzog
government during the Pact's two terms in office.7 With surprising consistency these
authors have ignored the intimate ties between the different members of the cabinet and the
directors of the mining groups. But it is to those networks that we must turn in order to
assess the characteristics of the allegiance between state and capital. The relationship
between the government and the mining industry in the 1920s was a delicate spider's web
of mutual interest and obligation that key members of the Central Mining Corporation and
the Pact Government tried to expand and strengthen. The gold standard crisis came closer
to tearing the web than any event in the inter-war period. But the 1932 crisis was simply
the culmination of a process of political and economic manoeuvring between the state and
capital over the relationship between gold and money that framed the Pact administration
temporally and splintered it politically.
State and Capital
To say that Sir Evelyn Wallers, Martin's predecessor as Johannesburg Director of
the Central Mining Corporation, was anxious about the coming to power of what he called
the "Pact-Labour combine" during the campaign that began in April 1924, would be an
understatement of the truth. Wallers was so alarmed that he considered running for
Parliament himself. Creswell, of course, was very much a known quantity.8 What
frightened Wallers were the hostile declarations of the Nationalist MPs and particularly
those of Tielman Roos, who argued that the Pact government would tax the mining industry
to the fullest extent possible without crippling it, and C. W. Malan, who announced in the
Platteland that the mining industry was a wasting asset from which the most should be
extracted in the shortest time possible. Other powerful figures in the industry viewed the
probability of a Pact triumph with rather more equanimity than Wallers' could muster.
Chief amongst these was Samuel Evans, the Chairman of Crown Mines.9 Evans was torn
in his assessment of the new Pact government by Crown Mines' vulnerability to Creswell's
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The mines had long been fam1 liar with Creswal 1 ' s wh 1te labour pol ides, and the
Central Mining Corporation as well as the rest of the Gold Producers' Committee,
realised that the presence of the leaders of the Labour Party in the Cabinet posed a
real threat to the systematic managerial discipline that had been established
underground fol1ow1ng the 1922 str1ke . The go Id producers were also deeply concerned
about Creswell's public promises to terminate their Moiambican recruiting operations.
The severing of the Mozambican labour supply would have deprived the mines of their
most dependab1e and skilled workers, and exposed them to tne seasonal and c1imat1c
cycles of the South African labour market.
Three facts determi ned that Evans was to play a centra 1 role in the go Id
standard drama. In 19O9, Evans was appoi nted Chai rman of the amalgamated Crown Mi nes,
Limited by Julius Wernher, a Job wh1ch he kept unt11 his death i n 1935. Crown Mi nes,
was, for most of that time, by far the largest gold producing mine in the world.
Evans, then, was present in Johannesburg for very much longer than the string of
younger men, like Wallers. Rogers and Martin who were his superiors, and because of the
importance of his fiofdom he had direct access to both the state and the twenty
thousand men who 11ved and worked at Crown Mines. Finally, Evans was f1xated
throughout his life, 1n the opinion of his peers at Central Mining to the point of mild
insan Tty. by the gold standard quest ion.
embargo on Portuguese recruitment, a condition he blamed partly on the SAP's restriction
of the Mozambican supply, and his affinity to the fiscal orthodoxy of the Nationalists. He
was particularly attracted to the two candidates for the post of Minister of Finance who
were both "out and out adherents of the old-fashioned gold standard", J.G. van der Horst
and the M.P. for Fauresmith, O.F.S., N.C. Havenga. Nor did it hurt that Havenga
publicly repudiated some of Tielman Roos' more extravagant fiscal proposals.10
It took the mine-lords very little time to realize that, politically and personally,
Havenga was to be the cornerstone of the new relationship between the Pact and mining
capital. The new Minister of Finance flattered Evans by listening to his views on fiscal
policy and the gold standard before any of the industry's leading lights had met their
Ministerial counterparts, and by confiding, to Evans' delight, his determination to return
South Africa to the gold standard with or without Britain. But Havenga's popularity was
not confined to the orthodox monetarists of the mining industry, he rapidly earned the
approval of all sections of the industrial elite. By the end of May, 1925, Wallers, after
bemoaning the obscurity of the rest of the Pact Cabinet, wrote to his directors in London
that Havenga was "probably as good a Minister of Finance as we have possessed for many
years past, and there is no doubt that by his reasonableness and commonsense he has
established a great reputation on all sides".11
As it turned out the Groups had a little less to worry about than they had
anticipated. Despite his campaign speeches, Tielman Roos rapidly sought to make amends
and to accommodate the desires of the mining houses, while Hertzog, after reminding
Wallers of the role of the mining industry in the fall of the South African Republic,
expressed a desire to let bygones be bygones. With Creswel!, as Minister of the newly
created Department of Labour, and Beyers as the Minister of Mines, the gold-lords faced
more interference and departmental hostility than they had done since the South African
War—particularly in terms of the Mozambican quota and managerial discretion~but, before
December 1931, they had dependable allies in two of the most powerful figures in
Hertzog's Cabinet: N.C. Havenga and Tielman Roos. And it was these two men who were
to play the central roles in the gold standard crisis.12
Support for the Gold Standard
It was to Havenga, then, that the leading lights of the industry turned in the week
after Britain left the gold standard. Evans held a private interview with Havenga on
Tuesday the 22nd, just twenty-four hours after it had become known in South Africa that
sterling was no longer convertible. On Friday most of the Gold Producers' Committee
including the President of the Chamber, John Martin, also met with the minister. At these
interviews the counsel of the minelords was unambiguous: South Africa should adhere to
the gold standard. Martin, in particular, could see no reason to link the South African
pound to a currency as politically and economically unstable as sterling. He argued,
against his London Board, that it was not in South Africa's national interest, nor in the
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interest of the mining industry, for the SA£ to be linked to sterling until the British political
crisis was resolved.13 It was this position that Arthur French, Chairman of the Chamber,
took when he expressed the mining industry's unqualified support for the "wise and
necessary decision" made by Havenga and assured the public and the government of the
"readiness of the Mining Industry to assist and co-operate in any measures designed to
protect and serve the national interests in the difficult times through which we are
passing".14
We should be a little wary about taking the Chairman of the Chamber of Mines at
his word. The minelords had a narrow understanding of the concept of national interest;
they were under few illusions as to their own importance to the South African economy and
they announced, incessantly, that what was good for the gold mines was good for the
nation. And, as we shall see, the mines were rather stingy about assisting the government
and the public during the crisis that followed. Nonetheless, it behooves us to look closely
at the reasons for the Mining Houses' early support for the gold standard. At the very
onset of the crisis those, like John Martin of Rand Mines, directly concerned with the
direction and quantity of the flows of capital between the mines and their metropolitan and
local shareholders and finance houses, were concerned about the vulnerability of sterling as
a store of value. Others, led by Samuel Evans, had been fighting a prolonged struggle,
against the recent, powerful, presence of the Central Banks, to secure the monetary value of
gold and thus ensure the long-term value of gold as a commodity. To these people the
snapping of the legal thread that bound currencies to gold threatened not merely the stores
of capital but the future of gold and the Witwatersrand mines. In this sense what they
feared most was the predicament which confronts the gold mining industry today. For the
industry's pragmatists, and its visionaries, the maintenance of the gold standard system was
both economically and psychologically imperative.
If these two themes preoccupied the minds of the minelords for the first week of the
crisis, they quickly came up with several more once they had time to think about it.
Foremost was the lesson of the last time a gold premium had been achieved by devaluing
the pound. The minelords were deeply reluctant to remove the keystone of value that had
maintained industrial peace since the early years of the decade. Martin put the issue
succinctly in justifying the government's opposition to devaluation to Evelyn Wallers in
London:
... it has to be remembered that the Union Government were influenced in their
decision by what the Minister of Finance considered to be the best interests of the
Gold Mining Industry. He had in mind, as we also had in mind, the experience of
the Industry ten years ago, when a large portion of the Industry was endangered by
the conditions that followed the operation of a substantial premium on gold and the
drastic measures it became necessary to take when the premium fell and ultimately
disappeared. To have linked ourselves with a fluctuating sterling would have
produced a fluctuating premium on gold. Demands for increased wages which it
would have been very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to resist would have
followed immediately, and any eventual deflation would have produced similar
The London directors of Central Mining ware concerned with the uncertainty that
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problems to those which the Industry confronted in 1922.15
In the month following the crisis Martin believed that altering the value of the mines'
product could only serve to weaken the minelords in their ongoing struggle with the white
workers.
But he also knew that the appearance of a state generated premium would do more
than dramatically weaken the managers' hold over production. It would threaten the
directors' control over dividends and transform the relationship between the state and
mining capital. From the onset of the crisis Havenga made it clear to him that any
dramatic increase in profits caused by the devaluation of the pound would be absorbed by
the state. Martin and P.M. Anderson, Managing Director of the Union Corporation, who
between them formed the dominant alliance within the Gold Producers Committee of the
Chamber of Mines, were both convinced that their success in resisting confiscatory taxation
under the Pact government would be undermined by devaluation, and that once further
taxes were in place the industry would never be able to dislodge them.16
During September and October 1931, then, the Johannesburg directors of the mining
houses had compelling reasons to urge the government to maintain the gold standard. Yet
by the 7th of November the Gold Producers Committee had decided, unanimously, to
announce their opposition to South Africa remaining on the gold standard.
The Opposition of the Chamber
The international character of the 1932 crisis granted the Chamber of Mines certain
advantages that had not been available during the post-war crisis. Three weeks after Britain
and the rest of the Commonwealth had announced the separation of gold and sterling, the
Chamber began to communicate with its Australian counterpart~the Australian Mines and
Metals Association-in order to gather information on the consequences of devaluation. The
link by cable to Australian mining capital gave the minelords the power to look into their
own ftiture. They were particularly interested in the affect of devaluation on the demands
of Australian workers. The first, terse, reply they received in October, "Up to present,
internal price level unaffected by change, consequently no increase in wages or costs",
intrigued both William Gemmill, the General Manager of the Chamber, and Samuel Evans.
But when the question they posed in December, "Have conditions altered since your cable
16 October ...?", was answered, "No, except that gold premium now approximates 80 per
cent", the minelords no longer had any hesitation about confronting the possible demands of
their white and black workers, or the displeasure of the state.17 Towards the end of
October, enlightened by their Australian intelligence, the minelords realised that devaluation
in the midst of depression and in concert with the rest of the sterling system offered a
unique opportunity to undermine the cost of labour. Evans, previously the most militant
supporter of the gold standard on the Witwatersrand, explained the shift in a letter to the
Princeton economist, E. W. Kemmerer, the most prominent academic proponent of metallic
money. He justified the dissolution of the system by arguing that "in countries with strong
Trades Unions and adult suffrage, like England, Australia and South Africa, devaluation is
the only way in which the serious disparity between the cost of production and wholesale
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prices can be ... remedied". The Chamber of Mines began, thereafter, systematically to
contest those who argued that abandonment would mean an increase in the level of white
and black wages. Their argument-that the cost of living had declined significantly since the
Lucas awards were announced in 1927-served the dual offensive purpose of opposing those
who were concerned about the inflationary consequences of devaluation and, more
significantly, laid the ground work for the oncoming struggle over the workers1 share of the
gold premium.18
At a special meeting, called on the 13th November, the Chairman announced the
opposition of the Chamber to the gold standard and urged the government to link the SA£
to sterling. Even at this point the members of the Chamber could not bring themselves to
acknowledge the radical character of the break between gold and money. Anderson
remarked from the floor that the mineowners did not see the "departure from gold" as a
permanent move, but envisaged a remarriage as soon as it became possible. That the break
was to be permanent, and that it would mark a complete change in the manner in which the
mines marketed their product, generated profits, and planned production, was something
nobody in the Chamber took seriously.'19
The Reserve Bank, the Chamber and the money supply
The formal announcement of the minelords' opposition was not received in silence
by the state. For the first time in its brief history, the South African Reserve Bank entered
into the contest between the government and mining capital. On the day of the Chamber's
special meeting, the Bank issued a press statement, declaring that "there is no reason
apparent to the Reserve Bank why South Africa should go off the gold standard". And,
with heavy sarcasm, took aim at the members of the Gold Producers' Committee: "... in
some important quarters there has been a difficulty in fully grasping the great change in
banking conditions in this country, which has been brought about by the establishment of
the Reserve Bank." The statement issued by the Governor, J.M. Postmus, punctuated a
period of uneasy cooperation between the Bank and the Chamber that had lasted since the
disappearance of the previous gold premium. In the seven years that preceded the gold
standard crisis the Gold Producers Committee, the Reserve Bank and the Royal Mint were
involved in an uneasy alliance that determined the material economy of the South African
money supply. It was their cooperation that made possible the ascendancy of gold coins as
the custodian of value for capital, the state and migrant workers. These changes in the
political economy of money served to bolster systems of value that had been in place since
the beginning of the century. But the struggles within this tripartite coalition nearly
wrought much more extravagant transformations to the contours of the international money
supply.
From the middle of November 1924, just five months after the Pact government had
taken office, sterling began to harden in relation to the dollar and the minelords considered
their options in the, now certain, event that the premium disappeared completely. After
discussing their predicament with the Treasury and the Mint, Central Mining turned to the
Reserve Bank to convert the vast amounts of refined gold into cash.20 For most of 1925
the relationship between the mines and the Reserve Bank remained on an ad hoc basis with
18
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the bank undertaking to buy all the gold offered to it. The Mining Houses viewed this
relationship as something of a mixed blessing. There was strong resistance within the Gold
Producers' Committee to a permanent link between the mines and the central bank,
particularly from the groups that had interests in the major commercial banks. But by June
1, 1926, the Chamber, persuaded by the security of a guaranteed market, signed an
agreement with the Reserve Bank that formalized the weekly sale of gold to Pretoria.21
The eighteen months that preceded the agreement measured the duration of a
struggle between the minelords and the South African branch of the Royal Mint over the
form in which the mines were to realize their product, and the material character of the
South African and international money supplies. After resolving the immediate cash flow
crisis that was precipitated by the sudden increase in the value of sterling at the beginning
of 1925, the mines began to look around for a more permanent solution. In February the
Chamber of Mines asked the Treasury to intervene in order to bring the productive capacity
of the Pretoria Mint up to 40 million sovereigns annually—roughly equivalent to the total
gold production of South Africa and Rhodesia. By the middle of April the mines had
already converted £1.2 million worth of go!d into sovereigns to cover wages and expenses,
and they estimated that over the period of a year these expenses would amount to £10
million. The remaining 30 million sovereigns would be deposited into the banks and
would, presumably, have made their way through either the commercial or central banks
onto the international gold markets. The mines' threat to mint all of their gold would have
completely reorganised the South African money supply: by the end of 1925 the total issued
paper money supply in South Africa amounted to just over £9 million. But it would,
simultaneously, have altered the money supply of most of the British Empire and the form
of international exchange transactions. For Britain's return to the gold standard on April
27, 1925, unlike South Africa's, did not entail the mass circulation of gold coins but,
rather, the use of bullion to resolve trade deficits. Unsurprisingly the Pretoria branch of
the Royal Mint was given specific instructions from London to discourage requests for
minting, to delay in the event that failed, and, finally, to "refuse point blank" those
applications obviously intended for export.22
For most of the minelords the minting of gold was a simple way of bypassing the
exchange charges levied by the banks on currency transactions, but for Samuel Evans,
before 1931, the monetization of gold was an element essential for the maintenance of the
industry. Evans, and his mania for monetization, had been instrumental in the
establishment of the Germiston Refinery by the Chamber of Mines, and the mines had done
well out of that suggestion. By 1928 the mines had saved over a million pounds on the
small charges that would have been levied for refining in London. Thus, when Evans
presented his mildly eccentric ideas about money and gold to the Gold Producers
Committee, his views were given a full hearing. Evans was convinced that the British
government was conspiring to drive down the value of gold measured in goods and services
by restricting the number of gold coins in international circulation hence weakening
demand. His contacts within the Union bureaucracy fed him confidential titbits about the
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British Treasury's attempts to discourage the Union from coining gold. As it became clear,
from the middle of 1925, that Havenga was, nonetheless, going ahead with the coining of
gold, Evans began to direct his venom against the concentrated and invisible power of the
central banks. He argued that the profits of the Reserve Banks were directly dependent
upon their ability to substitute paper money for gold. The South African Reserve Bank was
required to hold 40% of the value of the total note issue in gold while the remaining 60%,
or £5,400,000, was held in interest bearing assets. The central banks would not receive
any of that income if the money supply was coined in gold. He concluded that "It will
always pay the Reserve Bank to give the Gold Mining Industry more for its output than
could possibly be got by sending the gold to Pretoria to be minted.M23
Evans failed in his attempt to convince the Gold Producers' Committee to "convert
the whole of our gold output into sovereigns and half-sovereigns at the Mint in Pretoria,
use the coin to pay expenses and do everything we possibly can to extend the use of gold
coins by the Government and the Public of South Africa". But the reasons for his failure
had little to do with their rejection of his anxieties about the long term monetary role of
gold. The mines declined to coin their output, partly no doubt because of the resistance of
the mint, but mainly because they had found a massive, non-monetary, market to absorb
refined gold bars. In the course of 1924 the mines sold, out of the total production of 10.8
million ounces, the extraordinary amount of 5.7 million ounces in bars and sovereigns to
India. About one-third of the total production was sold in bars directly to India from
Durban. The following year the mines, once again, sold over a quarter of their total output
directly from Durban. Some idea of the magnitude of these sales can be gathered by
comparison with sales to Europe which, at 627,104 ounces in 1924, amounted to little more
than a tenth of the amount consigned to India. It was this massive, apparently insatiable,
demand for non-monetary gold, which discouraged the mines from coining their gold. As
the Master of the Pretoria Mint put it, "So long as Eastern demand lasts I do not think I
shall be called upon to produce forty millions...".24
The mines did not flood South Africa's money supply with gold sovereigns. The
agreement with the Reserve Bank, and the prior consignment of South African gold to
London, ensured that South Africa did not undergo a radical expansion in the national
money supply. It was for this reason that South Africa was the first amongst the major
international sites of bullion production not to devour its own wealth through the radical
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to India also acted to cement the relationship between the Chamber and the Reserve
bank. As part of the agreement signed by the Chamber and the bank on June 1, 1926, the
mines, as Evans had predicted, were offered a better fixed price for their gold than
they could have achi eved by m1nt1ng 11. But the other ma1n clause of the agreement
stated that the mines and the bank would share, 1n the ratio of 6O% to 4O%, all profits
earned on sales made directly to India. The Reserve Bank expi1c1tly saw the possibility
of a share in the profits of the India trade as a Justification for ths concessions and
complication involved in the sale of the Chamber's gold. The sales did not last for
ever—by 1928 they had begun to decline dramatically—and the Reserve Bank learned
after 193 j that contro1 over the foreign disposition of South Africa's go Id prov1ded It
with political and fiscal powers that far exceeded participation 1n the sale of gold to
Indi a. The mass1ve sales of the mid-192Os also came back to haunt the mi nelords dur1ng
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inflation of the money supply. Unlike the West African, Andean, American and Australian
gold and silver mines, the bulk of South Africa's gold remained in the hands of the central
bank whose chief responsibility was the regulation of the velocity of the domestic money
supply. To Evans' fury, the Chamber of Mines even gave the Reserve Bank permission to
abolish the half-sovereign, a coin used only by the mines and eastern exporters, in 1927.
But they methodically followed the rest of his injunction to "... do everything we possibly
can to extend the use of gold coins by the Government and the Public of South Africa". M
With few exceptions, between May 1925 and September 1931 the mines paid the
wages of both their white and black workers in gold. Of the large mines, only Anglo's
Springs and Rand Mines' E.R.P.M., paid their white workers partially in notes or cheques.
(The massive Boksburg mine would have preferred to pay in gold but the local banks were
unable to meet its demands.) Crown Mines, Evans' fiefdom, paid out more than 12,000
sovereigns every week. Rand Mines, which in the 1920s owned and operated by far the
largest group of gold mines, paid out no less than 3.1 million sovereigns in weekly wages
during 1927. To the weekly amounts paid out to white and black workers on the Rand,
have to be added the gold paid out by magistrates and recruiting officials as deferred pay.
The total wage bill for African workers on the gold mines between 1925 and 1933 hovered
around 9 million pounds per year. As we have seen, the issued money supply for the
whole country amounted to less than 10 million pounds in notes in 1925. The mines were,
thus, able substantially to recast both the form and the velocity of the money supply simply
by paying their workforce in gold.26
The bulk of the gold paid out as wages for white and black workers was
immediately recirculated, but the massive proportions of the money supply paid out by the
mines in gold, nonetheless, played havoc with the attempts made by the officials at the
Treasury to measure the money supply. The gold payments had much the effect that Evans
had intended; a portion of the gold was repatriated directly to the homes of migrants in the
labour reserves of the Cape and to Portuguese East Africa where it was removed from the
reach of either the commercial or the central banks. In the course of disbursing nearly one
fifth of their production to migrant workers, the mines ceaselessly fostered the notion that
African workers believed that value resided only in gold. 27
Metallic Mystique
From the end of the first world war to the end of the gold standard crisis the mines
were involved in an ongoing struggle with the many arms of the South African and
Imperial states over the form of money. As we have seen this conflict exercised many of
those who occupied the dizzy heights of capitalist power in South Africa in the interwar
period. But the minelords were also embroiled in a debate with their own workers, on an
almost weekly basis, over the meanings of gold, the forms of money and the value of
labour.
The first serious challenge to the psychological identification of money and gold
took place a full decade before the gold standard crisis. In April, 1920—just a week after
the first large scale African strike on the Rand—the management of Rand Mines, Ltd.,
Vilar. P. A History of Gold and Money. 145O-192Q. London, 1976, ppl31-l38: The
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began to consider the consequences of paying their African workforce in paper money.
The group's compound managers were asked to give details about the manner in which
African miners had been paid in the past. Responses varied little from that given by the
chief compound manager at E.R.P.M., the fourth largest mine on the Rand, who pointed
out that wages had always been paid in gold and that "it would not be advisable to pay
wages otherwise than in specie as the natives have a most decided objection to notes". At
Crown Mines, the largest and richest mine, the chief compound manager feared for the
future of the labour supply because of the workers "doubt of the genuineness of notes".
But, faced with the certainty of the introduction of the Currency and Banking Act in
December 1920, there was little that the mines could do to accommodate the fears of the
compound managers. The acting manager of New Modderfontein, the most profitable mine
in the Rand Mines group, downplayed the fears of his own compound officials as he
pointed out that if the industry acted in concert, and was "prepared to meet a little
disturbance", the workers would have no choice but to accept their wages in paper. In the
event this was, more or less, the strategy that the industry employed. On friday December
17, 1920, the first paper money pay-day, the mines ensured that at least twenty shillings of
each worker's wage was paid in silver, and the Native Recruiting Corporation supplied the
mines with a leather belt to replace the money-belts normally used by workers to safeguard
their coins. While it is clear that the workers were suspicious of paper, and that they had
good reason for preferring gold, the compound managers' fears of the consequences of
violating the conditions of the metallic mystique were not borne out. The workers had very
little choice, as S. K. Mckenzie, later the Chief Compound Manager of Crown Mines, in
discussing the events of the changeover, pointed out.
... the introduction of paper currency was made at a time of general depression and
after lean years throughout South Africa, it was very reluctantly accepted by the
natives, and then only after the Compound Officials had very minutely and
thoroughly explained the position and [because of] the Mine natives great confidence
in the Mining Companies, from whom they generally admit they get a straight deal.
Fear was often expressed that if Germany won the war, they—the natives—would be
holding a large amount of paper money which the Germans would not accept at face
value. Gold they contend is always worth its face value.
Nonetheless, within two months the payment of wages in paper money had been routinized
and the NRC had withdrawn its injunction that twenty shillings of each pay packet had to
be paid in silver.28 Both the industry and the workers crossed the psychological threshold
separating paper from metallic money with less fanfare than many had anticipated.
But the suspension of the gold standard in 1920 was not permanent. In 1924 and
1929, the Kemmerer-Vissering Commission and the controversy over the abolition of the
half-sovereign, provided the Industry, and Samuel Evans in particular, with the opportunity
to reconsider the attitudes of African workers to money. In the two weeks in December,
1924, that Kemmerer and Vissering had to consider the issue of the restoration of the gold
standard, they found time to interview Basil Warner, the Assistant Commissioner of
Swaziland, and friend of Evans. The evidence that Warner presented suggested, explicitly,
that the labour reserves of Southern Africa had only partially undergone the transition to
paper money. After pointing out the initial difficulties that he had had in persuading
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workers to accept paper money for deferred pay in 1921, he argued that male migrants
objected to paper because it was unable to withstand the exigencies of rural life and was
particularly unsuited to the forms of saving practised in the labour reserves. Paper money
could not withstand burial under the floor of a hut and when hidden in the thatch it was
easily destroyed by fire. Warner shared a vision with contemporary rural informants of the
labour reserves peppered with small, buried hoards of gold sovereigns. The affinity of
Africans and gold went beyond the infrastructure of rural saving. Warner and the
Commissioners also felt free to indulge in a bit of speculative metaphysics about the
proximity of African workers and their money. "One difficulty with paper money with
natives," commented Warner, "... is that the money which they carry on their bodies
becomes very insanitary". When Kemmerer, the eminent economics professor from
Princeton, asserted magical sterilizing qualities for gold~"With the metal there is said to be
an acid action that kills the disease germs?"-Warner, the tax-collector, could only sagely
agree.29
The rural areas were not the only sites of migrant life unsuited to paper money.
When Evans was conducting his unsuccessful campaign for the restoration of the half-
sovereign he urged his Chief Compound Manager to examine the adequacy of notes for the
trials of mine work and compound existence. In his answer Mckenzie pointed out that
between 1920 and 1925 workers had often attempted to exchange mangled notes for valid
ones, and he stressed the devastating physical impact of mine work on paper money:
having no means of hoarding or saving money except by carrying it on their persons
in armlets or body belts ... paper money becomes very insanitary, torn and
dilapidated almost beyond recognition, and when tendered was either rejected or
paid out at less than its face value. I have experienced notes rendered to a mass of
paper pulp through being carried next to the owner's body and becoming saturated
with perspiration or water while at work, or during rains. This condition is also
brought about by being folded and refolded into very small capacities and the
friction caused during work. When in this state they become a dead loss to the
natives and a gain at their expense to the Government.
Unsurprisingly, in this light, he noted that African mineworkers were generally delighted to
see the return of gold coins in 1925 and that notes were shunned by workers thereafter.30
"These Mountains are fall of Money"
There is much that is a shared in the accounts about gold produced by mine officials
and in the contemporary descriptions given by old Mpondo migrants and the folklore that
surrounds them. When old Mpondo men who migrated to the mines in the twenties and
thirties talk about their work, the word they use to describe the gold underground and the
gold that they were paid is imali. Indeed, it seems that only recently has the word for
money~ima//--been distinguished from the word for gold—igolide. Throughout their
accounts old mineworkers deliberately describe their work as the mining of money.
In north-western Pondoland, a region that had amongst the very highest rates of
migrancy to the gold mines in the inter-war period, people speak of the way in which the
old people used to protect and regulate money. Old migrants and their children are
adamant that the wage of a young migrant mineworker was the property of the homestead
For the -Fiscal background to the commission see De Kock, Reserve Bank. pp67-7S
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head-usually his father. A very old man, whom we may call Nyati, was unbending when
asked teasingly whether he ever kept gold for himself. "There's nothing I thought about. I
gave it to Father. Father would buy for me—and he would say: "Here's something I
bought for you". The very unanimity of these claims suggests that they are, in part, a
criticism of young people today, but they also indicate that there was an association
between gold and authority within the homestead. Informants insist that married women
and daughters were not allowed to possess their own hoards of gold coins and that young
men were obliged to surrender their earnings to their fathers, whose sole responsibility it
was to hide the coins. Wives were only expected to keep small change or pocket money;
gold was the product of male labour and the property of male homestead heads. Nyati
speaks of old men leaving their houses in the dead of night to bury their gold. "Ewe, the
old ones hid it underground, you see, in a tin this big. The father would put it in this tin ~
- and take it to a mountain and dig to put it there. These mountains are full of money. A
person with money there will know that all by himself." Only gold was returned to the
ground from which the migrants had worked so hard to remove it . "No, paper money
was not hidden underground. Paper money was not dug for." Afterwards, the decision to
share the secret of the hiding place with his sons was entirely at the discretion of the
homestead head but the ubiquity of stories of middle aged men who are still looking for
their fathers' hoards suggests that often they did not. Generational mistrust was at the core
of the exchange between fathers and sons. "Unless the father understands your mind, he
can't show you when he buries your money — You'll only see that you have worked when
a cow is bought." It is not incidental that the cleavage between father and sons was
resolved by the purchase of cattle adding to the prospects of brideprice.31
Sad tales about lost or forgotten hoards of buried gold are commonplace in areas
like the Tabankulu district of western Pondoland. The stories stress the need for
intergenerational communication in both the real world and between the living and the
dead. But read collectively they suggest that the popular memory of the period before the
gold standard stresses the permanence and durability of gold. Moreover, in stark contrast
to paper money, the hoards of metal are represented as having almost magical abilities to
accrue value.
In the sixty years since the gold standard crisis, gold has completely disappeared
from circulation in the rural areas of Southern Africa. Only recently, in the form of
Krugerrands, have gold coins re-entered the domain of the rich as a store of value. In that
time the systems of value associated with metallic money, and particularly the symbolic
politics of gold, have been replaced by the ferocious liquidity of inflated paper money. For
the few people old enough to remember the change, the transition was obscured by the
drought that threatened the survival of crops and herds. Nonetheless, those who were old
enough to remember stressed that the velocity of metal money was slower than paper, that
metallic money was more powerful precisely because people "would be scared to use it" .32
The elaboration of cultural fabric around the meaning and value of gold was not an
activity unique to migrant mineworkers. The minelords situated gold within their own
complex symbolic universes. But in the case of both the mineworkers and their bosses, the
meaning of gold that came closest to fixing its value was prompted by the connection
between gold and labour. As we have already seen the minelords invested varying amounts
of intellectual and psychological energy into the meaning of gold, but there were,
nonetheless, ideas common to them all. One of these claims was the association between
interview Breckenridge, Mzayifani and Nyati-,7/1/92; Discussion with JM, 24Mayl99Z
ibid.
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gold and racial/imperial overlordship. As A. J. Limebeer, the Chamber's resident
intellectual, told the Johannesburg Economics Society in 1928, "the races which, from time
to time, have been paramount have almost invariably worked or controlled supplies of
gold". In other ways the symbolic order in which gold had for long been comfortably
situated was obviously decaying around them. By the late 1920s most of the minelords
were bitter about the monetary destabilization caused by the enormous quantities of gold
being absorbed by the United States, and all of them saw the goldfields of the
Witwatersrand as a wasting asset whose decline was remorselessly approaching. But in the
decades leading up to the gold standard crisis and for many years afterwards the minelords
believed that the primary characteristic of gold as a monetary standard was its capacity to
regulate itself. The claim that gold automatically secured the value of money and that it
did so without the need for the intervention of the banks or the government was held by all
the leading members of the industry and most of the international financial elite. This
capacity to secure value without acting was held to be the only satisfactory means of
maintaining the psychological credibility of money. As Neville Chamberlain, in the midst
of the international death throes of the gold standard system, told the financial leaders of
the City of London:
I have heard it suggested that the measures taken by the various members of what is
known as the gold bloc mean the final end of the gold standard, mean that we are
about to enter upon a new era, the feature of which will be a permanent
establishment of managed currency. Well,I think it is very unlikely. I do not see
any reason to alter the view which I have expressed before, that in the end we will
probably come back to an international monetary standard on the only basis which
appears to give confidence.
The self-regulating quality of gold lay at the heart of the nineteenth century episteme that
saw the role of money as a neutral one in which, as Vilar put it, "the economists believed
that products were simply exchanged for other products". By the late 1920s the gold
standard system was coming apart at the seems, and the tortured relationship between gold,
money and commodities was highly visible. Nonetheless, gold's capacity to secure value
was held to be an enduring quality by the minelords and it was the conditions of production
they believed determined both the value of gold and its capacity to secure the value of
money. "A currency based on gold", Limebeer argued,"is linked directly to human effort.
Any form of managed paper currency may be based indirectly on human effort, but it is
based directly on human judgement". This is not an unambiguous statement of the labour
theory of value, but it does suggest that the minelords, not just their workers, saw the value
of gold—the first commodity under capitalism~as being anchored by the conditions of mine
work.33
Banks in the Compounds
Much of what compound managers like Mckenzie thought of mineworkers' ideas
about money and value was based on the apparently simple economy of saving that operated
on the mines and in the countryside. But in October, 1927, it came to the attention of the
Gold Producer's Committee that matters were getting complicated in the compounds. From
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New State Areas to Crown Mines, workers were paying subscriptions into saving societies
in order to supplement the pay they took home at the end of their contracts. Over the next
month, probably at the urging of the GPC, the police began to investigate allegations of
fraud that had compound managers across the Reef up in arms. Many of the stories of
saving societies in the compounds that came to the attention of the authorities and the
newspapers involved tales of theft and mismanagement. The organisers of a society at
Simmer and Jack lost the £400 that their members had accumulated. At Crown Mines, the
treasurer of one of the societies pleaded guilty to pilfering £51 from the collective hoard of
sovereigns. Contemporary newspaper reports represent these events as testimony to the
naivete and gullibility of the workers, but they also present evidence of the organisation and
solidarity characteristic of migrant associations. Formal bureaucratic structures appear to
have been a feature of the savings groups. In the case at Crown Mines, the treasurer's
theft was brought to the attention of the authorities by the society's secretary. Societies at
Springs Mine, Village Deep and Crown Mines appointed workers as treasurers, secretaries
and chairmen. All along the Reef the savings groups followed the ethnic fabric of
compound accommodation with members initially coming from amongst the occupants of a
room and expanding along ethnic networks. Both the police and the Gold Producers
Committee saw the savings association as pyramid schemes, where those who were paid out
first would benefit at the expense of those paid later. Much of the evidence supports this.
Kotazile, a mineworker at Village Deep, explained that the system offered workers £3 for
every £1 paid in, that pay-outs were made in the same order as deposits, and that "as more
boys paid in, more were paid out". But those being prosecuted in the Village Deep case,
and the workers giving evidence against them, agreed that workers could not leave the
system until the others "became rich". Moreover, the state failed to prove that the savings
associations were criminal in intent or function. Most significantly, as they investigated
claims of fraud, the police uncovered evidence of legitimate associations with massive
financial resources. A treasurer at the Village Deep mine was found to be in possession of
£2000—the full monthly wages of five hundred workers. Another at the Robinson Deep
held over £900.M
The compound managers acknowledged that they knew very little about the
dynamics of the savings societies. The workers tended to avoid the financial structure
sponsored by the mines. This may have been because the GPC prevented compound
officials from accepting funds from savings societies, but it also seems that they were
designed to bypass the systems of "safe-keeping" offered by the compound managers. The
officials acknowledged that the amounts held on deposit at mine offices had declined
dramatically since the expansion of the savings societies. Saving in the compounds was,
thus, very much more complicated and sophisticated than those officials who were
responsible for assessing African attitudes to money were prepared to acknowledge. The
efforts of the workers to increase their earnings contradicted the tight corporeal relationship
between workers and their money that Mckenzie offered to his Chairman. Nonetheless,
while the infrastructure of saving did not marry with the essentialist features of the metallic
mystique, the savings associations still operated very much within a metallic economy. On
all the mines the collected capital—held exclusively in gold coins-was kept in the
compounds, usually in the steel trunks that became markers of migrancy from the mid-
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1920s. The workers at Simmer and Jack, who lost £400, had kept their hoard in a
ventilator high up the compound wall. Between 1925 and 1931, mineworkers mobilized
their own metallic economy in an attempt to secure the value of money and labour.35
What, then, are we to make of these anomalous hoards of gold in the compounds?
The first point is the simple one that contradicts the representation of mineworkers as
alienated drones of industrial capitalism.36 Collective saving disrupted the binary exchange
of labour between African migrants and white capitalists. Saving societies, like other forms
of migrant organisation, were expressions of collective solidarity and mutual interest. The
dismissal of most of the prosecutions directed against the compound banks suggest that very
few of the subscribers had complaints against the societies. Unlike other popular forms of
worker association, the saving societies confronted the symbolic core of industrial and
financial capitalism directly and sought to recast it on the collectivist terms of migrancy.
Contemporary newspapers ridiculed the mineworkers' claims that the savings societies were
attempts to make money the way that white people did, but discussions with old migrants
suggest that the workers in the compounds organised collective saving in order to avoid the
exaction of interest payments. Mineworkers were involved in a complex set of
overlapping pools of debt and interest. The most prevalent of these were the advances
offered by traders to secure the recruitment of workers. The indebtedness of migrant
workers to the traders is a subject that requires a more detailed examination than there is
space for here. A short extract from Hunter's wonderful ethnography of Pondoland must
suffice to reconstruct the perils indebtedness.
Many Natives are in debt to traders. Book-debts of traders in the Transkei are
estimated at £1,000,000. Traders frequently charge a very high rate of interest. I
knew one who kept his own police, prison hut, and handcuffs and incarcerated
debtors until they were released by their relatives. Had he sued them under the civil
law of the country he would have been charged under the Usury Act.
As Taberer explained to Gemmill in 1924, South African mineworkers organised collective
credit in order to limit their exposure to the usurious interest rates charged by the traders,
and in the process avoided the rigid infrastructure of savings and transmission offered by
the deferred pay system.
The growing difficulty the natives find in taking advantage of the Deferred Pay
Scheme is due to the system of credit obtaining amongst traders in Native
Territories. Owing to this system most of the recruits on arrival at work borrow
from their friends in order to liquidate the debt they left unpaid at home and these
friends will not make loans if the borrowers happen to be on Deferred Pay and so
are unable to make refunds until the expiration of their contracts....
Both in Pondoland and in the compounds on the Rand, mineworkers organised collective
credit associations of varying scale and effectiveness specifically in order to avoid the
immense cost and unique perils of rural credit."
Rand Daily Mail, llNovamberl927
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Money and Mozambican migrants
The material economy of money in the compounds and the reserves played an
important part in mineworkers* valorizations of gold as money in the 1920s, but another,
equally important imperative, was the enthusiasm that workers recruited from Portuguese
East Africa had for metallic money. These men, variously known as East Coasters or
Portuguese natives by mine officials and as Mashangane by South African workers, never
constituted less than 40 per cent of the mine workforce between the end of the first world
war and the onset of the Depression. Their presence in every compound, and the fact that
the average length of time they spent on the mines was almost double that of South African
migrants, meant that they had a powerful influence on the cultural characteristics of mine
life. Mozambican workers, negotiating a journey between the competing sovereignties of
the South African and Portuguese colonial states, had very good reasons to prefer gold to
paper money. Even before the first implementation of inconvertibility, in December 1920,
Portuguese officials had been quick to ensure that they did not have to bear the same
inflationary burdens as their workers. They informed their workers, informally, that those
bringing South African paper money back with them to Mozambique would face a two
shilling charge on every pound. After the devaluation those workers who managed to carry
their South African wages through the border faced even more serious encroachments on
their meagre savings. Workers at Modderfontein B informed their compound manager that
storeowners in the Delagoa Bay area were offering only 15 shillings for every pound that
the migrants presented. And, as Gemmill pointed out to Modderfontein's manager, there
was little that the mines or workers could do to prevent the discounting of paper money:
It would ... be no benefit to the natives to provide Portuguese notes for them, as
these would be received with even greater reluctance by traders. As a matter of fact
the currency which is most in favour at the moment in Portuguese territory -
although like Union notes illegal - is British silver, and I would strongly urge that
Portuguese natives returning to their homes be recommended to take a proportion of
their savings in the form of British silver.
Mozambican migrants learnt from bitter personal experience that paper money did little to
protect the paltry fruits of their labour. It is not surprising that "during the period of paper
currency", as Mckenzie from Crown Mines reported, Mozambican migrants "sought for
and obtained gold at a premium of from 10 to 12.5%\3g
The migrants personal financial incentives to secure their wages in gold were
complemented by the reluctance of Mozambican officials to accept their spoils in South
African paper money. In 1922 the Portuguese authorities enacted legislation that prohibited
the circulation of all foreign currency, except the gold sovereign, within Mozambique. The
legislation made any South African money in the territory, including the repatriated wages
of mineworkers, subject to confiscation. From 1922 to 1925, migrants were forced to
exchange their South African paper money wages for Portuguese currency, minus a 5%
discount, at the four points of entry at Ressano Garcia, Pafuri, Maplanguene and
Massengeri. In 1928, the Portuguese Government ensured that both wages and state
revenue would not be earned in paper by including Article 26 of the convention regulating
Mozambican recruitment: "All moneys payable under this Convention whether taxes, fees,
38 BRA Method of pay i ng natives paper currency, 1473X , 192O - 42 . 856 , Act 1 ng
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39wages, gold or other moneys shall be paid and settled in gold".
Within a week of the announcement of Britain's withdrawal from the gold standard,
local banks were attempting to withhold the gold used by the mines to pay the wages of
African workers. The suddenly increased speculative value of gold sovereigns made the
banks reluctant to issue them as wages. The Curator of Portuguese Natives, resident in
Johannesburg, as well as a number of mine managers reluctant to deal with annoyed
workers, immediately drew the attention of the Gold Producers' Committee to the
conditions of the Mozambique Convention. The Chamber of Mines, accordingly, brought
the banks quickly back into line. On October 16, the mines conceded that white wages
would be paid in paper but that "this arrangement does NOT, of course, apply to the
payment of natives". Throughout the remainder of the crisis, while the speculative value of
gold followed the political and economic oscillations of both Britain and South Africa,
mineworkers continued to receive their wages in gold.40
Many of the cultural, especially the symbolic, characteristics of the system of value
generated by metallic money have not been recovered here. Simple difficulties of memory
make the recovery of the ideas and ideologies associated with gold almost impossible to
recapture. Moreover the qualities of paper money have tended to be superimposed on the
symbolic systems that existed during the gold standard period. We know very little about
the manner in which African migrants read the signs that gold coins carried into the
hinterland of the labour reserves. But the silence about the meaning of money has not
merely been produced by the shortcomings of human memory; invisibility is one of the
central cultural characteristics of money. It is for this reason that the fact that
mineworkers were paid in gold has for so long gone unnoticed in the academic literature.
During the gold standard period a number of detailed ethnographic monographs and
overviews were written about the societies that provided much of the gold mines' labour
force. Junod's Life of a South African Tribe was based on mission work in Mozambique
during the first quarter of the century. Monica Hunter's Reaction to Conquest was
researched in Pondoland during the gold standard crisis. Isaac Schapera wrote overviews of
the economic life and cultural change of the South African peoples, as well as a more
detailed study of the BaKxatla reserve in Botswana, much of which was researched during
the years of the crisis. Both Hunter and Schapera document the importance of money to
the economic life of the societies they studied, and as we have seen, Hunter's work was
particularly sensitive to the gendered character of money and the particular dangers of debt.
Yet none of these texts mention the presence of gold coins or notice any clash between
paper and metallic money. This silence stems, perhaps, from the desire to highlight the
apparently unchanging aspects of African social organisation and culture. This charge is
supported by the fact that ethnographers documented archaic and extremely rare examples
of gold workings and precious metal trade. But it was also a product of the immense
interest shown by both ethnographers and their subjects in the economic and symbolic value
of cattle.41
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It is not the object of this study to dispute the claim made by earlier ethnographers,
or more recent ones, that "livestock remain the ideal medium for the exchange of wealth".
As Ferguson has shown, investment in cattle is the product of ongoing political struggles
within the households of migrant workers and, as the Comaroffs have also suggested, such
investment is a conscious strategy to restrict the erosive capacity of money. The centrality
of cattle to the maintenance of social and symbolic integrity of most Southern African
societies for most of this century is not in question. Indeed, old male informants stress the
importance of investing in cattle as one of the primary uses of money, whether metallic or
paper. It may be true that money appeared to undermine the systems of value associated
with cattle, in the manner that Ferguson and the Comaroffs have suggested, but certainly
not always in the same way nor with the same velocity.42 Moreover, the fact that the
meaning of money was shaped by a hidden politics is not a reason to ignore its history.
For it was the interior politics of money, involving a shifting matrix of relations between
labour, commodities, and the infrastructure of savings and transmission, which, by the
1920s, underpinned the systems of value centred on cattle. By 1930 the number of cattle in
Pondoland had reached the highest point in over a century. This accumulation was not
simply the result of the removal of resources from the monied economy. It reflected, on
the one hand the value of labour and wages measured in cattle during the gold standard
period, and, on the other, a set of savings practices and ideas that maintained the hold of
males and their fathers over the flows of gold into rural households.43 Before 1933,
metallic money served to hold the value of African labour, more or less, constant. It
fostered forms of saving and transmission that differed materially from the infrastructure
that followed. And it shaped the consciousness of migrant mineworkers directly. Gold
mining was seen as the making of money. Popular memories of gold reflect an epoch in
which the value of money and labour was both tangible and enduring. It was this system
that was brought to a close in December 1932.
The Great Depression and the Gold Standard Crisis
For migrant mineworkers the gold standard affair involved more than a struggle
between paper and gold, it was a crisis over the supply and velocity of money itself.
Between 1930 and the end of 1933, the temporal shift from the gold standard system to
managed paper money, was marked in the countryside by the desperate shortage of money.
The depression, and the inflated SA£, wrought economic havoc in the rural areas of South
Africa. The long term degradation of agriculture in the labour reserves was highlighted by
the alarming evidence given to the Native Economic Commission during the years of the
gold standard crisis. To make matters worse, the events that followed Britain's
announcement of inconvertibility coincided with the last years of the worst drought in South
African history. The drought caused crop failures throughout the labour reserves set aside
for African cultivation and in some areas the state was forced to declare that "actual famine
conditions" existed. In an urgent cable dispatched to the Director of Native Labour in June
1932, the magistrate of Mount Fletcher summarised the disastrous conditions in the north-
western Transkei. After imploring the Director to assist the four hundred migrants looking
for work in his district, the magistrate stressed the ruinous combination of crop failures and
restricted mine recruiting practices:
4Z
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Position from Native point of view serious as crops have failed for fifth consecutive
year. Recruiting has been restricted from January 1931. 21 Medically fit recruits
sent Maclear this morning only 13 accepted .... appeal to you for intervention on
behalf of large number of Natives seeking employment in any sphere 12 months
contract or over.
The magistrate stressed that the root of the crisis in Mount Fletcher was a desperate
shortage of cash.
No prices for produce and unless work on Mines etc. improve Natives unable to buy
grain and pay taxes as no money is in circulation
By the end of January 1932 the Department of Native Affairs had spent £55,000 on
emergency food aid for the rural areas. But they balked at embarking on large scale public
works programs in the reserves. They argued that the state would not be "justified in
placing this additional burden on the tax-payers so long as foreign Natives continue to be
employed in the Union's primary industry". Mozambican migrants, for decades the
mainstay of the mining industry and themselves suffering the consequences of drought and
depression, were thus held responsible for the predicament of South African migrants. As
the mines fiercely resisted the reductions in their Mozambican workforce the state was
provided with an easy excuse for its refusal to address the crisis in the rural areas. Nor
were the mines above taking advantage of the crisis in rural reproduction to reduce the cost
of African labour.44
Towards the end of May, 1932, the Gold Producers' Committee considered the
possibilities for a general reduction in the level of African wages. As Gemmill pointed out,
there was very little that could be trimmed. In November 1931, as a means of increasing
revenue to subsidize farmers suffering the effects of the gold standard crisis, railway tariffs
had been increased by a third. Since that time workers coming from the Transkei had
faced a £4 return ticket, in addition to the cost of bus transport from the rail depot to their
homes. The total amounted to more than a month's wages. Out of an average wage of
ls/lOd per shift, after transport costs, workers had to pay for two pairs of boots that cost
26 shillings. If the mines had made the ten percent reduction considered by the GPC that
would have put the average wage at ls/7d and left the bulk of workers with less than Is/Id
per shift. Even Gemmill, who was as diametrically opposed to liberalism as it was possible
to be, argued that such a reduction in African wages, unless applied to "all salaries and
wages, European and African", would be unfair. As a compromise measure the GPC
abolished the re-engagement bonus of 5 shillings for every thirty shifts worked paid to those
who had worked more than 270 shifts. The move amounted to a reduction in the wages of
experienced workers of 2d per shift and it was directed very largely at Mozambican
workers whose contracts, at 313 shifts, automatically qualified them for the bonus. The
abolition of the bonus was clearly a serious misfortune for the workers, but it also
represented a change in the strategy of the mining industry and a move away from a
progressively skilled workforce to take full advantage of structural unemployment.45 As the
events of the gold standard drew to a close the minelords were in an unprecedented position
of strength in relation to their African workers. The same cannot be said of their relations
with the state.
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Antagonizing the State46
The mines, of course, were not powerless but they were wary of the consequences
of antagonizing the dangerously beleaguered state. In the middle of October, as the
consensus in the Gold Producers Committee was shifting from support to opposition to the
government's policy, the Germiston Refinery—effectively a subsidiary of the Chamber of
Mines-urged its members to withhold all gold not directly required for the cash
requirements of the mines, thus limiting the gold available to support the South African
pound. John Martin was urged by the London directors of the Central Mining Corporation
to transfer the large sterling balances of Rand Mines from Johannesburg to Paris. He
refused, arguing that such an open violation of the industry's public protestations of co-
operation would simply invite retaliation from the state. He added that the Gold Producers
Committee was already afraid that the state would act to regulate the supply of gold coming
from the mines in the next parliamentary session.47
The Pact government did not, as it turned out, confiscate the mines gold production
or enforce sales to the Reserve Bank, but that did not heal the relationship between the
Gold Producers' Committee and the Cabinet. The war of words began when Havenga, no
doubt intentionally, quoted the views of Sir Henry Strakosch in support of the gold
standard. Strakosch was the Chairman of the Union Corporation and P.M. Anderson's
boss.48 Like most of the intellectuals appended to the mining industry he had changed his
views on the gold standard and the Chamber requested Havenga to retract his statement or
to publish a correction. In answer, the Minister attacked the Chamber directly, accusing
Martin, who was President in 1931-2, of supporting the abolition of the gold standard in
order to increase profits at the expense of wages. During the same debate the dangers of
the rift between state and capital were made explicit when Hertzog rose to speak:
If there is one thing which my Minister's and I have consistently tried to do, it is to
make it as easy as possible for the mines to carry on their industry in the interests of
the country, as well as in their own interests. It will go very hard with them in the
future, however, if we find them striving to conceal a desire to further their own
interests behind a pretence of patriotism.
The Chamber was in no position to answer the Prime Minister's threat in kind. As usual
they turned to their daily newspapers as a means of pressuring the government and the
public into abandoning the gold standard. In fostering opposition to the gold standard the
As 1931 drew to a close the fabric of the all lance between the state and mln1ng
capi tal that had been so carefu lly woven by Mart 1 n and Havenga» began to tear
violently. Capital's -first act Ions to earn the wrath of the stats came not from the
mining Industry--wh1ch had so piously dec Tared its public a 1 log1 anee to the state's
strategy--but from the two largest banks, Bare lays and Standard. The Department of
Finance was furious with the two banks for insisting on buying their massively
1ncreased ster11ng requ iremants from the Reserve Bank. Havenga bel1eved that the banks
were refus 1ng to draw on their own ster11ng balances In order to force the country off
the gold standard. By the end of the first week of November ster11ng sales from the
Reserve Bank had been so heavy that only the weekly supply of gold from the mlnes
maintained the country's supply of foreign currency. The bankers were summoned to meet
Havenga in Pretoria where, according to Martin, "great pressure" was placed on the two
banks to make aval Table between them f1ve mill1on pounds ster11ng. In exchange Havenga
agreed to raise the same amount In the form of a foreign loan from New York. But both
In the Un1 ted States and, thereafter, 1n Europe, the South African Treasury's attempts
to raise capital for foreign exchange were vetoed by the J. P. Morgan Bank. The
relationship between Anglo and J.P. Morgan 1s, of course, obscure. Hocking's evidence
suggests that in the early 1920s Ernest Oppenhe imar viewed the relationsh1p between the
mining house and the bank as a long term, strategic one. He was certainly extremely
candId with the bank about his long term plans in the diamond 1ndustry. After the 1922
strike the Morgan group sold their Anglo holdings but the close relationship between
the company's did not end. In 1925-6 J. p. Morgan, and Its London subs1d1ary, Morgan
GrenfeIT, prov ided the financial back 1ng for Anglo's takeover of De Beers. Hock 1ng, A.
Qponnheimer and Son. Johannesburg, 1973, pp69-14O. In the light of the Immense
i nvestment EFTs wouId have involved, 11 seems extremely unlikely that Oppenhe imar wouId
not have made his vlews on the gold standard known to the bank. CAD TES 673O,
f53/2S9/6, Eric Louw "Memorandum on the attempts to obtain a Union Government loan or
credit in New York" , 04November1931; op cit- , From Saleg, the Hague to Pr imus,
Pretoria, 11November1931; op eft., Louw, OINovember1931.
47
 CMA Gold Standard--1931, Gemmi T1 to GPC members, 1SOctovber1931; BRA Private
Cables, jan 1931—Jan 1932, Martin to London directors, 16Novamber1931
18
 For Strakosch's pivotal role In the previous gold crisis see Ally "South
Africa's monetary system", ppl7-19
2 3
newspapers enabled the minelords to focus on the English-speaking bourgeoisie whose faith
in the stability of the South African pound was essential to the maintenance of the gold
standard system. But the state, too, had dangerous tools at its disposal. By the middle of
1932, Martin wrote to his superiors that he was being pressed to "do voluntarily a variety
of uneconomic things". One example was the employment of an additional eight hundred
white silicotics in Rand Mines companies, "The suggestion", he complained, "amounting
to something like a threat, is that if we do not yield in this direction we are running the risk
of having additional burdensome legislation passed upon us....".49
Despite being sorely tempted, the directors of Central Mining, Anglo American and
the Union Corporation could not bring themselves to enter into open conflict with the South
African cabinet during 1932.so But as South Africa approached the Christmas the
minelords were, once again, approached for their support from a political movement
opposed to the gold standard. On the 20th, representatives of Tielman Roos, the Nationalist
politician whom Hertzog had attempted to exile by appointing him to the Appeal Court,
called upon P.M. Anderson asking for the backing of the mining industry for a non-
partisan, populist campaign against both the gold standard and the Nationalist government.
To Martin's astonishment and dismay, Anderson liked the idea and cabled off to his
chairman, Strakosch, for approval. In London, Wallers and Strakosch evidently discussed
the proposal and sent word to both Martin and Anderson vetoing any political adventurism
on the part of either the Union Corporation or Central Mining-Rand Mines. The following
day, Tielman Roos resigned from the Appeal bench and entered politics with a campaign
against the gold-standard and a proposal for a government of national unity. In the course
of 1932, the general economic depression, the opposition of Smuts' SAP, and the sustained
media campaign of the English-language dailies, had so weakened the psychological
credibility of the gold standard that, within three days of Roos' political re-entry, the
country was forced off the gold standard by the removal of middle-class savings from the
49CMA Gold Standard--1931, Minutes of the GPC 2 3Novembarl931; The Star.
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By March S, 1932, some of the members of the Chamber of Mines decided to confront
the state on its own polltica1 terra in. On that day, Wi111 am Gemmi11 held an 1nterv1ew
with George Albu and N . S- Er1 iegh. The two men d i scussed their Intention to form the
Non Party Ant 1-Go Id Standard Association of South Afri ca and asked for the forma 1
support of the Gold Producers Commi ttee . To bo 1 ster the i r pet 11 ion they ment -toned that
they had secured the fu11 support of both The Star and the Rand Da 11 y Ma 11 and that
advertising costs would thus be kept to a minimum—not necessaFTTy the wTsest argument
to make to those who owned the papers. Both of these men held interesting places
within the mining ru ling class. Er 1 iegh' s pos ition in the Chamber was an unusual one.
As the representative for Luipardsvlei Estate, he was one of only two members not
affiliated to any of the powerful mining houses. George Albu was one of the few genuine
young turks amongst the m-i ne lords . His father was Sir George Albu, the last of the
republican magnates still on the Rand. Unlike Evans, who had been around since before
the South African war, and those, like John Martin, who managed the largest mining
houses, Albu's family owned a controlling share in the General Mining and Finance
Corporation as well as heavy Investments in the Durban Deep and E-R-P.M companies
managed by Rand Mines. George Albu was shortly to 1nher1t both his father's title and
his position as Chairman of the board of General Mining. At the meeting of the GPC
called to discuss the proposal on March 14 the members representing the six powerful
groups de1i berated about formally entering Into poli 11cs aga inst the government. The
minutes of the meet ing prov1de little i nformat ion about what was said but it is clear
that there was disagreement about supporting the movement. Resolutions from the GPC
normally use the word "unanimous" to describe the manner in which decisions were
reached. The record from that day is one of only a handful that reveal a majority
decision. At the very least we can assume that Albu and Erleigh got the support of
Arthur French, the General Mining representative, and it is possible, especially in the
light of later adventures, that Goldfields backed them as well. Gemmi11's letter to
Erleigh summed up the ambivalence of the minelords feelings about open political
conf 1 Tct. "The GPC" , he wrote, "wh1 le 1n fu11 sympathy with the objects of your
association, feels that ... it would be contrary to its policy to associate Itself, and
the mining industry as such—for the present, with the campaign that you have in mind".
The GPC's reluctance to support Albu and Erliegh speaks volumes about the political
contours of the mining ruling class. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Anglo-Amer1 can,
Central Mining and the Union Corporation nurtured close, cooperative ties with both the
Pact and Fusion governments. None of these groups were prepared to Jeopardize the
polItica1 capital, however attenuated, of their relations with the cab 1 net by return 1ng
to the overt pol 11 i ca1 conf1ict of the Unionist party. CMA Gold Standard--1932,
Erliegh to Gemmi 1 1 , O9Marchl93 2 ; op CTT'£.. Minutes of the GPC , 14Marchl932 ; op cf t . „
GemmiTl to Erliegh, 14Marchl932
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For the Treasury and the Reserve Bank, Tielman Roos' announcement of opposition
to the gold standard put an end to what they saw as a period of fiscal recovery. They had
come to rely on the naive conviction that the mere fiscal stabilization of the monetary
system would restore the credibility of the gold standard. Postmus, the Governor of the
Reserve Bank, could even speculate about extending the assistance given to the Nationalists
political constituency, "the farmers, the unemployed and other innocent sufferers of the
world depression".52 But within three days of the announcement, the stumbling momentum
of the recovery had turned into an hysterical retreat. On December 23, the banks let
Havenga know that they were very anxious to meet with him to discuss state intervention
into the deteriorating conditions of foreign exchange. By the end of the week, the
commercial banks and the Reserve Bank sent a joint appeal to the Minister of Finance. The
thrust of the letter was contained in its first paragraph:
We have the honour to inform you that in consequence of the political situation that
has developed, the public, acting upon the assumption that South Africa's departure
from the gold standard is imminent, are purchasing exchange and withdrawing gold
coin so heavily that it is reasonably certain that the position will become untenable
within a few days. It is our duty to inform you that in our view, in order to avoid a
crisis of the first magnitude, immediate steps should be taken to protect the Bank's
exchange and gold resources by suspending the convertibility into gold coin of
Reserve Bank notes.
The following day, an extraordinary Government Gazette announced the formal separation
of gold and money.53
Consequences
The most immediate result of the abandonment of the gold standard was the
dramatic increase in the monthly profits announced for each of the mines at the end of
January. The annual figures for 1933 are testimony to the spectacular increases in revenue
and profits generated by the devaluation of the South African pound. Revenue from the
sale of gold jumped by twenty million pounds after 1932, a record year itself that saw the
mines' gold revenues approach 50 million pounds for the first time. The gold mines
announced dividends of slightly more than 13.5 million pounds in the year following the
gold standard crisis, a 50 percent increase on the figures produced for the previous year.
But more significant than the massive increases in profits and revenue was the shift that
took place in the long term development of the mines. Between 1912 and 1932 the annual
revenue of all the mines had risen from 38 million to about 50 million pounds, and for
much of that period revenue had remained in a tight band around 40 million pounds. After
the gold standard crisis the mining industry entered a new period of exponential growth that
would see revenue double in the short space of four years and then triple after the next
devaluation of South African currency in 1950. What these figures reflect is the fact that
S1BRA London Letters Directors' Confidential, 1929-35. Martin to Waliors,
23March1932; BRA Pr1vate Letters -From Johannesburg, 1932, 195: BRA Private Cables,
1932-33. Martin to Wallers. 3 IDaceitiber 1932 ; op eft., Martin to Wallers, 22D8camberl932
In the course o-F 1932 the central bank had managed to accumulate gold reserves
equivalent to 6O% of the country's money. Most of the other financial institutions,
from the Commercial banks to the insurance companies, had managad to re-establish
normal lending operations without assistance from the state. The central bank had even
been able to return 1.3 million sterling of the uncovered funds made appropriated from
Barclays and the Standard. The bank and the Treasury were confident about the
country's trade surplus and the relatively healthy condition of the national budget.
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prior to the gold standard crisis the industry had functioned on the basis of a more or less
fixed price of gold. After 1932 the South African gold mining industry was fuelled by two
new factors. The first was the cyclical increase in the demand, and corresponding increase
in the value, of gold during periods like the 1930s, and the second was the intervention of
the state to adjust the South African monetary value of gold so as to secure mining profits.
After 1932 the profitability of the mining industry was driven less by the technological and
managerial imperatives that had increased profits and revenue in the 1920s, than by the
steadily advancing value of gold measured in South African currency.54
The fact of the mining industry's dependence on the state for its massively increased
profits was not lost on either the Afrikaans press or the Nationalist cabinet. Worried about
Die Burger's incitement for state seizure of the gold premium, John Martin went to
interview Havenga in Pretoria to try to sort out what the government intended to do about
taxing the premium.53 He came away reassured that the Nationalists intended to "do
nothing of a confiscatory nature". Despite the finance minister's assurances, and the
entrance of the mines' closest friends, like Patrick Duncan, into the cabinet after the Fusion
of the SAP and NP, the Budget speech that Havenga delivered on May 30, 1933, came as a
devastating shock to the minelords. In justifying the appropriation of the lion's share of the
gold premium, Havenga made it very clear that the industry owed its dramatically renewed
profitability, and durability, entirely to the state.
South Africa's departure from the gold standard and the subsequent depreciation of
our currency have had the effect of increasing the value ... of the production of the
gold mines by many millions. This is an increment due solely to State action. It is
maintained by State action under the Currency and Exchange Act, and is no wise an
appreciation of the assets of the shareholders .... In considering its attitude to the
premium, the State need therefore not be concerned with any claim that this money
belongs by right to the shareholders.
The minelords, having at last won the war of the gold standard, seemed set to lose the
peace.56
To reverse Havenga's proposed seventy percent appropriation, the Chamber of
Mines turned to their most influential ally in Parliament. Sir Robert Kotze immediately
began a systematic campaign against Havenga's tax proposals.57 In both the press and in
private correspondence with Smuts he stressed the threat of the tax proposals to the mines'
plans for expanded development and the investment of new foreign capital. Within a
month, Patrick Duncan, acting as Minister of Finance in Havenga's place, had redrawn the
tax proposals. The new plans limited state income earned directly from the excess profits
tax to £6,000,000. (Other state revenue from leased mines and normal income tax
amounted to almost fifteen million pounds in 1933, an increase of more than 10 million
pounds.) In the end the mines managed to hold the excess profits tax to what amounted to
Union statistics for fifty years; Transvaal Chamber of Mines Annua1 Report, 19SO
Martin's confidence that he could negotiate with a Nationalist government in nodampened his encouragement -For the establishment of the alliance the SAP and the
Nationalists that began to come together after February 1S. He saw an all lance between
Hertzog and Smuts as the best means of limiting the excesses of the nationalists, wh1le
ma1ntaining the legit1macy, and power, of the mines' political allies in the SAP.
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Kotze was the SAP member of parliament for Springs, had been appointed
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"From a gold price in excess of lSOs per ounce. The mines were only saved by the
outbreak of the second world war and the disintegration of Fusion.
a fifty-fifty deal. But from 1933 the fiscal relationship between the state and the mining
industry lost its symmetry. Both the cabinet and the GPC were acutely aware that the
profits of the gold mines were dependent upon state intervention.
The new system of value inaugurated by the abandonment of the gold standard
endowed both the state and capital with considerably increased wealth. This change came
largely at the expense of African workers. The snapping of the ties of value that bound
money and gold freed the mines to shift the scale upon which the value of the labour power
of African workers had been measured. From the late 1880s to 1933 the labour power of
African workers had been measured at about a fifth of the total value of their product
[Figure 3]. Throughout that period, with the exception of the 1920-5 interlude, the value
of African wages had been kept relatively constant and literally tangible by the payment of
gold. The abandonment of the gold standard dramatically increased the commodity value
of African labour whilst, initially, holding wages constant. Those who sought to address
the state and the Chamber of Mines on behalf of the voiceless mineworkers did not miss the
evidence of surplus labour extraction. In March 1933 the United Transkeian Territories
General Council appealed to the government to ask the Chamber of Mines to pay all
underground workers an additional shilling for every shift worked. In justifying his appeal,
Counsellor Bokleni used the firm logic of metallic money to represent the extraction of
surplus value.
The young men who are working on the mines are helping to work the gold in the
mines so that gold can be made into money.... I think that the labourer drilling
holes at the mines is earning hundreds of pounds and he only gets a few shillings.58
But the contours of the distribution of wealth on the gold mines had transcended the simple
extraction of surplus labour by the time Bokleni spoke. As the councillors soon became
aware, the portion of the mines' product paid to the miners was also declining in value.
From the mid-1930s, inflation began to undermine the value of mineworkers' wages
[Figure 5]. In October 1935, the Transkeian council again requested the mines to raise the
general level of wages. The councillors pointed to the increased cost of living and stressed
the massively increased profits being earned by the mines in the wake of abandonment.
Wellbeloved, the man who replaced Taberer as Native Labour Advisor after the latter's
death in June 1932, responded to the Council's demand by denying that any important
changes "in the mode of living of the raw native" had taken place since the end of the first
world war. But, from Christmas 1935, the mines did increase the minimum wage of
underground workers to two shillings per shift. This increase affected the least skilled of
underground workers and particularly those employed on lashing and tramming whose
numbers had increased dramatically during the expansion of development work and more
efficient machine drilling. It was specifically designed to meet the "popular native
conception of a cash wage [of] about 2 shillings per day". The increase had only a very
small influence on the average wages of African workers which, in any case, were at their
lowest levels since before the first world war.59
The position of white workers on the mines after 1933 in many ways appears to
resemble that of African workers. Despite the initial militance of both rank and file and
officials of the South African Mine Workers Union, by the end of 1934 Martin noted that
the mines had not been forced to make significant concessions to their employees. "It is, I
CMA Native Labour- MISCQIlaneous--1933, United Transko1 an Territories Genera 1
Council to Gemmi11, 28Marchl933
59CMA Nat 1ve Labour Ml seel 1aneous--1935, Act 1 no D1rector of Nat 1ve Labour to
Genera 1 Manager TCM, IGOctober193S; op eft., W©11beloved to Roberts, 02Novemberl935
op ci t . , L imebeer to Roberts, 02Novomber-1935; op c l t . , Gemmill to All Mine Managers
23Oecemberl935
consider, remarkable", he wrote to Frank Phillips, "that in these two years of off-gold
standard conditions, with all the spectacular increases in profits, the large increases of
average dividends, the enormous appreciation of share-market values, the atmosphere
created by periodical share-market 'booms', there has been no increase of wages ....".
What the stagnation of white wages does not reveal is the manner in which the mines
provided for the welfare, recreational and retirement needs of white workers during the
1930s. During the same period, apart from the increase of the minimum wage to 2
shillings per shift, African mineworkers received a 2 shilling subsidy on the price of the
boots they were required to buy and, in 1939, the Chamber agreed to pay the rail-fares of
South African and Tropical recruits. The total annual cost of the concessions granted to
African employees amounted to £730,000 and involved, by 1941, over 350,000 men. The
benefits granted to the forty thousand white workers, not including the cost of living
allowance or the unemployment fund, amounted to about £80 pounds per worker and cost
the minelords in excess of 3 million pounds. There is strong financial evidence that the
gold standard crisis marked the point at which white mineworkers, on the whole, began to
view their interests less as being in contradiction with those of mining capital, and came,
increasingly, to see themselves as allies of the mining groups in the struggle against African
workers.60
In the wake of abandonment, gold ceased to circulate in the compounds and
communities of Southern Africa. Where gold was kept on the bodies of migrants before
1933, those that followed rarely even saw it. Dzingwe, a man from Mount Frere who
worked on the mines for many years after the gold standard crisis reflected on the
forbidden and inaccessible character of the products of gold mining. "There, there were
other people — even the clothes they wear don't have pockets—the overalls then. Because
people working there used to steal the mud and go to sell it in the locations. Gold mud.
When it comes out of the place where it's cooked, being taken to the Time Office, it comes
out being a brick—this big. It goes to—that money is sent to England. We never saw it
but it's a stone—the small brick—is this big, of gold."61 The complex overlapping arenas
of value ascription that had characterized the operation of the gold standard system were
distilled to a single distant site involving half-a-dozen men. After January 1933, every
working day at half-past eleven, representatives of the gold merchants, the Bank of
England, and Rothschilds met in the London offices of Rothschild and Sons on
Threadneadle Street to decide the value of the gold produced by the South African mines.62
Implications and Conclusions
This re-examination of the gold standard crisis suggests that we need to look much
more closely at the cultural history of Southern Africa in the twentieth century. In
particular, it questions assumptions about the history of commoditization and monetization
and implies that the sharp dichotomy that is said to exist between money and cattle is real
In 1934 the mines set up a prov 1dent -Fund for Its wh its workers , prov ided 11
with an initial capital of £500,000 and made monthly contributions of 24 shillings for
every worker. In the same year all employees received an extra week's pa 1d leave. The
amounts paid out In leave bonuses, medical benefit allowances and the provident -Fund
were 1ncreased almost every year thereafter. In 1938 the Chamber set up the Prov i dent
Fund Savings Branch and contributed £13 to the accounts of all whIte adult employees.
In 194O the mi nes established an unemployment benef11 fund and made weekly
contributIons on behalf of all their wh ite employees. From the middle of the fo1lowi ng
year all wh i te workers race 1ved a cost of living alIowanee based on the W1twatersrand
reta il price 1ndex. BRA London Letters D1rectors' Conf idential 13Z9-3S. Mart in to F.
Phillips, O4Decembarl934; CMA Native Labour Mi seallaneous ( 2 ) 1941, Concessions to
European Mine Employees and Concessions to Native Labourers, 7November1941; op cit.,
Limbeer to Members of the GPC, 7Novomberl941
Interv iew Breckenridge, Mzayifani and Dz1ngwe 22August1992.
52
 Rand Da 1ly Ma1l-M1ninq & Finance News. 14November19 33
2 8
only in the most abstracted historical sense. Whilst the substantive and relational qualities
of metallic money are certainly very different from those of cattle, there are similar
differences between paper and gold. The transition effected by the gold standard crisis
suggests that systems of value in Southern Africa have undergone at least one major
reorganisation in the period of the monied economy. We have seen that many of the most
rapacious qualities of paper money, especially its velocity and capacity to undermine the
value of labour, were institutionalized after 1933. The contemporary ritual and rhetorical
symbolic power of coins, particularly as indicators of wealth, needs to be interrogated
against the historical backdrop of a system of value based on metallic money that has itself
been eroded by paper money. This task is all the more urgent if, as the Comaroffs have
convincingly argued, hegemony "is a product of the dialectic whereby the content of
dominant ideologies is distilled into the shared forms that seem to have such historical
longevity as to be above history--and, hence, to have the capacity to generate substantive
practices along the surfaces of economy and society.... They belong to the domain of fact,
not value. They are just there, ineffably."63 The gold standard crisis marks the point at
which some of the most powerfully naturalized forms and practices of the early twentieth
century underwent challenge and decay. The alliance between cattle and gold that
characterized the period after the first world war in the Transkei, gave way during the crisis
to an economy of practices assymetncally dominated by paper money. This paper has done
little more than to point to the existence of this abrupt transformation. A better
understanding of the character of this change awaits more research. But this study has also
tried to show that the tools of periodization that have thus far been used to delimit the
historical development of the South African state, the wider political economy and
processes of class formation are unnecessarily detached from the changes that have taken
place in the daily lives of the masses. The actions and ideas of the African working class
were directly involved in a struggle with those who have shaped the economic history of
South Africa. At many points their efforts were defeated but that is surely no reason for
ignoring them. The attempts to define periodization should not, perhaps, be so concerned
to discover why shifts in the political economy took place but rather to explore the manner
in which temporal processes shaped the lives of those who lived through them.
Which brings us to the broader question of the character of the transformation that
took place between September 1931 and Christmas 1932. The nature of the processes of
rural impoverishment has been the subject of considerable debate in Southern African
historiography. Simkins' work has been an especially useful caution against the invocation
of unwarranted and, often, unconscious teleological processes of proletarianization. But his
claim that rural African subsistence agriculture remained at a relatively constant level
between 1918 and 1955 is untenable. There is no doubt that, for migrants and minelords,
the gold standard crisis and the Depression which coincided with it constituted a dramatic
redefiniton of the political terms upon which they confronted each other.64
A few metaphorical points must serve here in place of a more detailed study. In the
course of 1920s the Chamber of Mines faced persistent and serious shortages in their
attempts to fill recruitment quotas. Moreover, Taberer and Gemmill constantly noted the
development of both subsistence and export agriculture in many areas of the Transkei. In
the period during and following the gold standard crisis, and prior to the second world
war, the mines enjoyed an abundant labour supply from those same areas. By the end of
63 Comaroff, J amd J. L . Of Revel at Ion and Revolut Ion: ChristianH t.y. Colonialist
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the decade the primary concern of the recruitment officials and medical officers appended
to the Chamber was for the declining basis of subsistence in the Reserves and the
consequent deterioration of the "physiques" of African mineworkers. But the gold
standard crisis did not simply coincide with the most serious crisis in rural reproduction in
the interwar period, it also served to shift resources into the hands of the minelords. In the
course of the 1930s, the mines abandoned the attempts made by Taberer, Charles Villiers of
the NRC, and a number of other mine managers throughout the 1920s to raise the level of
skill and wages of South African migrant mineworkers. The mines turned away from
scientific management to a recruitment policy that took full advantage of structural
unemployment, in part, because of the dramatic expansion in the size of the workforce
caused by the expansion of development and the opening of newly profitable goldfields. But
the fat profit margins that came after 1933 also quickly deflated any urgency to increase the
productivity, skill and motivation of South African workers.63
For the minelords the crisis was not an unambiguous victory. The Central Mining
Corporation, which up to that point had been completely dominant on the Witwatersrand,
entered a period of inexorable decline. During the speculative booms that followed the
crisis the company sold off shares in the mines that it believed were above "real" values
only to discover with time that they could not afford to buy them back. The corporation's
failure to invest as heavily as Goldfields and Anglo-American in the new mines of the Far
West Rand and the Orange Free State stemmed directly from the crisis. The snapping of
the thread between gold and money shattered Frank Phillips' faith in the future of gold, and
the economic potential of the South African gold mines. It was not the "imperial"
character of the Central Mining Corporation that was responsible for the company's failure
to invest in the West Wits, Klerksdorp or Free State Goldfields, as Kaplan has suggested.
It was the inability of those nurtured in the epoch of the gold standard to take seriously the
"unreal" value of gold shares, and their timidity in exploiting the new psychology of value
ushered in by the gold standard crisis.66
Finally, the crisis punctuates the history of the consciousness of migrant
mineworkers. After 1933 the products of minework were systematically removed from the
experience of most mineworkers. However poorly paid and alienating minework was
during the 1920s, it earned meaning as the making of money. The invisible inflationary
forces that undermined the value of migrant labour after the crisis were harnessed to a new
form of alienation aided by the obfuscation of mine work.
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